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Abstract 
This paper introduces a multi-country multi-regional model that allows the 
evaluation of the effects of trade openness in the internal distribution of 
economic activity across regions within countries. Relying on the agglomeration 
and dispersion forces characterizing the analytical framework of the NEG/NTT 
literature, we consider a general model with two differentiated sectors in terms 
of preferences, technologies and transport costs, and that allows for any 
feasible world trade network topology where trade frictions are both transport 
and non-transport related (tariffs). As benchmark simulations we choose two 
opposed domestic network topologies characterizing a homogenous space and 
a heterogenous space. Our findings show that trade openness changes 
locational patterns in favor of better located regions with respect to the new 
world topology. These results entail important implications in terms of transport 
infrastructure (accessibility) and trade (commercial agreements) policies, as 
both are related when policy makers set regional equality goals. 
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1. Introduction 
Currently, economic geography literature on the effects of trade openness on 
the location of economic activity is regaining interest for both scholars and 
policy makers, due to recent changes in political boundaries, and the attempt of 
some Western European regions to claim independence, which may leave them 
out of the EU: Flanders in Belgium, Scotland in the United Kingdom or the 
Basque Country and Catalonia in Spain. The topic is also making the headlines 
as more countries are getting involved progressively in new or existing free 
trade agreements or common commercial areas, with implications not just for 
new members, but also for the incumbents. One example is the 2004 EU 
enlargement, which integrated ten Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) into the EU's internal market, and has shifted Europe's economic 
center of gravity eastwards (Brülhart et al., 2004). Moreover, globalization 
processes are reinforcing the reduction in trade frictions related to economic 
and commercial barriers such as declining transport costs (result of the 
technological progress and improvements in transport networks), and the 
previously mentioned non-transport related impediments such as tariffs, quotas, 
etc. All these changes on international market accessibility of countries are 
generating prominent changes not only between countries, but also, and more 
importantly within countries; i.e., in the internal structure of the spatial location 
of economic activities in the countries involved in trade openness. 
The empirical results suggest that a liberalization process in the form of trade 
openness implies different gains depending on the territorial scale of analysis: 
between countries, resulting in the reallocation of economic activity at the 
international level, where countries reap the gains of international trade 
specialization, and within countries resulting in a complementary and 
simultaneous reconfiguration at the regional level, where we can observe 
whether there are winners or losers at regional level after the openness.  
Focusing on the analytical framework based on Helpman and Krugman (1987) 
and Krugman (1991), characterized by Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, iceberg 
transportation costs, and increasing returns, along with computer simulations, 
two complementary sets of models have addressed these two issues 
separately. On one hand, to model the effect of trade openness between 
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countries the literature relies on the analytical framework of the New Trade 
Theory (NTT). Normally, this type of models studies the effects of changes in 
non-transport related costs on the location of firms across countries without 
considering a spatial configuration of the transportation network. An exception 
to this restriction is Behrens et al. (2007a), Behrens et al. (2009) and Barbero et 
al. (2015), who allow for spatial configurations of the trading network between 
countries. On the other hand, to characterize the spatial implications of trade 
liberalizations within countries the reference literat ure relies on the New 
Economic Geography (NEG), which studies how transport related costs 
determine the distribution of the labor force at the regional level. For a set of 
results for different transport network configurations of the core-periphery model 
see Ago et al. (2006), Castro et al. (2012), Akamatsu et al. (2012), and Barbero 
and Zofío (2015). 
Both NEG and NTT models share a common structure.  Indeed, on the 
preferences side they normally consider an upper tier Cobb-Douglas (CD) utility 
function with homogenous and differentiated products, with the latter 
corresponding to a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) specification, which 
yields a suitable price index. Also, from a technological perspective, firms are 
characterized by increasing returns, and the market equilibrium is solved within 
a monopolistic competition market structure. Based on these assumptions, 
these models set the theoretical grounds so as to explain why economic activity 
may end up agglomerating in some countries (NTT) or regions of a given 
country (NEG), even if departing from a symmetric situation where all are 
initially identical from the consumers and producers perspective. The final result 
regarding the agglomeration or dispersion of economic activity depends on the 
net effect of counterbalancing centripetal and centrifugal forces. In these 
models agglomeration forces are driven by: i) the price index effect by which 
areas with large manufacturing sectors enjoy lower prices; ii) the so called 
home market effect (Krugman, 1980; Head et al., 2002) by which locations with 
larger markets have proportionally larger manufacturing sectors, paying larger 
nominal salaries; and iii) the existence of economies of scale in production that 
result in lower average costs at the single plant level. Dispersing forces are led 
by transport costs because the larger they are, the more difficult it is to supply 
other markets while competing with local firms, complemented with an immobile 
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share of workers in one of the sectors, normally the one producing a 
homogenous product, ensur  ing that a sizeable amount of final demand 
expenditure is territorially fixed1. 
While the theoretical frameworks share a common structure resulting in 
equivalent centripetal and centrifugal forces, the main differences between NTT   
force; i.e., the relevant difference when solving for the equilibrium is whether 
workers are mobile or immobile. While in NTT models it is firms mobility (so as 
to meet the zero profit condition) and the exports/imports trade balance what 
clear the market, and the spatial equilibrium can be characterized in terms of 
equal relative market potentials (RMP), in NEG models it is workers mobility 
what clears the market so as to equalize real wages across locations; i.e., the 
instantaneous equilibrium. Therefore, market equilibrium through RMP 
equalization in NTT and real wage equalization in NEG summarize the main 
difference between both types of models. 
Even if most multiple-country multiple-regions models deal with between 
and within country effects independently, without considering the 
complementary and simultaneous effects that trade openness has at both 
levels, a few contributions have considered jointly both the international and 
national dimensions; e.g., Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996), Alonso-Villar 
(1999), Behrens et al. (2007b). These authors attempt to characterize the 
impact of trade openness together with the effect of the topology of the country 
of interest, gathering both dimensions (between and within countries). To do so, 
they consider a limited number of countries (two or three maximum), which 
consist of one, two or three regions, where labour is mobile within countries 
(NEG assumption) but not between countries (NTT assumption). The main idea 
put forward in these theoretical contributions based on the NEG/NTT structure 
is that while the removal of national barriers increases the pressure of 
competition in domestic economies-being more attractive the farther locations 
with respect to the new competitors, it also brings global gains from 
international trade specialization-notably in a context of imperfect competition 
and scale economies, giving firms the opportunity of serving larger markets. 
This in turn may make more profitable the location near the foreign new 
                                            
1 The homogenous good sector, characterized by constant returns to scale, is normally 
associated with agriculture as in Krugman (1991), Krugman (1993a), and Krugman (1993b). 
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markets, particularly, if there are competitive advantages in the form of higher 
productivities and lower costs. Therefore, the existing balance of centripetal and 
centrifugal forces prior to trade liberalization changes once a country starts an 
opening process, generating new equilibria and spatial configurations. For 
example, if we start from a scenario of autarky (with neither international trade 
nor free input factors mobility), we know from NEG models that for a given 
transport cost, when the spatial topology is uneven, production and population 
will tend to agglomerate in the better connected locations, supplying the whole 
domestic market (i.e., the internal/central regions). However, once this economy 
starts a trade openness process and as a result of the aforementioned 
centripetal and centrifugal forces, we can think of two scenarios: one where the 
locations that agglomerate the economic activity reinforce their privileged 
position (centripetal forces are reinforced); and other where the frontier 
locations start becoming attractive to firms and start to agglomerate (dispersion 
forces become more relevant). In fact, if this economy starts to supply 
international markets, producers will seek to locate closer to the border in order 
to reduce transport costs and be more competitive, and consequently they will 
leave inner locations, where location was initially concentrated and, in this case, 
the whole reallocation process may result in lower regional inequality. As an 
example, this was the case of Mexico after the 1985 trade reform and 1194 
NAFTA agreement, where the manufacturing sector left Mexico DF to relocate 
in the border with the U.S.. 
Here we formulate a proposal based on this NEG/NTT structure that allows both 
for the traditional agglomeration and dispersion forces considered in a regional 
context and for international trade, and whose main contributions can be 
summarized as follows: i) It models a multi-country multi-regional setting with 
flexible configurations of the internal (regional) and external (world) network 
topologies; ii) It allows for transport and non-transport (e.g., tariffs) related trade 
cost across the national and international networks; iii) The model allows for two 
sectors of differentiated goods both from the technological (supply) and 
preferences (demand) sides, and are subject to sector specific elasticities and 
transports costs —even if symmetry in the parameters will be assumed normally 
as we focus or analysis on the  effect of trade openness. Therefore most 
models in the literature may be considered as special cases of this 
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generalization. Regarding sectoral production, while the tendency in order to 
simplify things is to consider that one of the sectors provides homogenous 
goods with costless trade, several authors have shown that introducing some 
heterogeneity and transportation costs in the "agricultural" sector has relevant 
implications, qualifying the attained results significantly (Davis, 1998 and Fujita 
et al., 1999). 
In sum, the model generalizes the exiting literature on the effects of progressive 
trade openness (transitioning from the autarky scenario to a fully integrated 
international market) in several dimensions: Topology, nature of trading costs, 
and sectoral differentiation, allowing us to study the implications of trade 
liberalization on the spatial configuration of the economic activity within 
countries. indeed it is the result of combining three key  contributions: Krugman 
and Livas-Elizondo (1996), who developed an international model with two 
countries to evaluate the process of international trade openness, where the 
domestic economy is characterize by an internal and external homogenous 
topology, and whose regions are equally located with respect to each other and 
the rest of the world; Alonso-Villar (1999), who introduces a heterogenous 
space within and between the countries, where the two economies are already 
fully integrated in terms of international trade; and Davis (1998) and Fujita et al. 
(1999, ch. 7), who consider a single country-closed economy-with two 
symmetric regions producing differentiated goods in the manufacturing and 
agricultural sector. 
The main results suggest that trade openness tends to favor the new bordering 
regions. However, the internal topology of the country and the initial location of 
the economic activity play an important role in the final outcome. While the 
model we propose allows for any number of countries and regions, to obtain the 
general results we produce some simple simulations in the context of a global 
economy constituted by two countries, both composed by three regions and 
where the country of interest is modeled according to two opposite domestic 
topologies: homogenous topology (a triangle configuration where no region has 
a locational advantage) and heterogenous topology (a star network). We have 
observed that given standard values for the main parameters of the model, in 
the case of a very centralized domestic transport network (start topology), the 
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inner region of the country enjoying a privileged position, will keep its prominent 
status even in a context of full integration.  
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews briefly the 
empirical literature on this field. Section 3 introduces the model assumptions, 
the general notation for any network topology representing the world economy, 
and the spatial conditions characterizing the so-called instantaneous 
equilibrium. Section 4 presents some simulations that illustrate the analytical 
potential of our analysis when establishing the effects of trade openness on the 
location of economic activity within countries, and depending on two opposed 
network topologies in terms of their centrality. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical evidence and theoretical explanations 
Brülhart (2011) describes two main concerns about trade openness and its 
spatial consequences, which literally are: "that trade liberalization increases 
within-country spatial inequalities, and that it favours regions with better access 
to international trade routes". 
In the literature, there are two main approaches to evaluate the spatial 
implications of removing international barriers within a country: the urban 
system approach, based on scale economies that are exogenous at regional 
level and based on perfectly competitive markets, and the NEG/NTT approach, 
which considers endogenously scale economies at the firm level and 
monopolistically competitive markets. Additionally, another distinction between 
the models of both approaches is related to the ex-ante assumption of locations 
of the regions within a country. Some models consider regions as geographical 
featureless units, i.e., regions are identically geo-referenced with respect of the 
foreign economy (homogenous space) (Henderson, 1982), while others 
consider that some regions enjoy from a locational advantage in the 
international relationship (heterogenous space), Rauch (1991).  
From an empirical perspective, and motivated by Mexico's integration with 
United States and Canada in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), several authors have studied the within-country spatial implications of 
this trade liberalization agreement under the prism of the NEG/NTT literature. 
Here we are interested in those contributions whose results can be interpreted 
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in terms of greater or lower regional (in)equality; i.e., whether economic activity 
has spread across the domestic regions, including lagging locations (a spatial 
convergence effect) or if the economic activity is even more concentrated in the 
locations where it was agglomerated before the opening process. Hanson 
(1992, 1997, and 1998) examines the effect of trade reform on regional 
employment in Mexico. He focuses on three key factors driving the regional 
distribution of firms and, consequently, employment: transport costs, which pull 
firms to locate close to large foreign markets; backward and forward linkages, 
which encourage sellers to locate close to buyers, and vice versa; and 
agglomeration economies, which reinforce the initial industrial pattern 
configuration. The pieces of the NEG/NTT workhorse model are there, but 
without considering the full-fledge general equilibrium framework that it offers. 
He found a significant effect of the trade reform, changing the previous 
agglomeration from Mexico DF manufacturing belt toward the formation of new 
industrial clusters near the United States.  
Other authors have studied the consequences of European integration, where 
the existing research does not provide a clear answer. In general, it seems that 
EU integration has promoted the convergence among countries, while regional 
inequality growth is country specific. Egger et al. (2005) find that for the Central 
and Eastern European countries, export openness brought an increase of 
regional inequalities in terms of real wages. Puga (2002) claims that, parallel to 
trade openness, "despite large regional policy expenditure, regional inequalities 
in Europe have not narrowed substantially over the last two decades, and by 
some measures have even widened". On the other hand, there are also 
evidences suggesting that trade integration promotes regional convergence, 
such as Redding and Sturm (2008). They studied the effect of German division 
(during 1945-1990) and later reunification, concluding that the iron curtain 
(representing both an ideological and socioeconomic conflict and a physical 
boundary) had a strong negative impact on border regions, so that 
disintegration leads to a core-periphery pattern. By contrast, with the 
reunification, they found signs of economic recovering in border regions. 
Bickenbach and Bode (2013) analyze the same phenomenon comparing 
qualitatively the parallelism between the NEG prediction and stylized facts on 
Germany economic integration. They conclude that NEG predictions matches 
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quite well with the integration process, described as a U-curve between 
agglomeration (in East Germany) and integration, highlighting that Germany 
could be near to the turning point of the curve by the years 2001-2011. 
Therefore we can observe different results in term of regional inequalities 
depending on where a specific country is located in Europe, but also within 
countries it seems that border regions are initially favored by trade liberalization. 
However, from a modelling perspective, the European Union integration 
process implies a more complex mechanism than the more limited NAFTA; as 
the former involved many countries, free trade of commodities, but also labor as 
a mobile input factor, which must be considered in theoretical models trying to 
explain reality.  
Hu and Fujita (2001) examined the trends of regional inequality in China, in 
terms of income distribution and production agglomeration during the period 
1985-1994. They choose this period because it captures the effects of 
globalization and economic liberalization in the Chinese economy.  They found 
that income disparity between inner and coastal regions increased, with 
industrial production agglomerating in the coastal area. So while the disparities 
increased at a country level, the convergence of coastal provinces increased. 
These results concur with those of Kanbur and Zhang (2005), where trade 
openness favored the already-richer regions in the coast. So again, the 
empirical evidence seems to indicate that openness favors bordering regions, 
while convergence depends on the initial distribution of the economic activity; so 
that, convergence will just take place when the lagging regions were the new 
bordering regions. 
Finally,  while it is true that most studies are country-specific, and therefore no 
general results can be drawn, Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose (2013, 2014) and 
Rodríguez-Pose (2012) find a positive and significant relationship between 
trade openness and spatial internal inequality across a representative sample of 
countries; an association that is stronger for the case of poor and emerging 
countries. 
 Driven by these empirical evidences, Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996), 
Alonso-Villar (1999), Brülhart et al. (2004) and Hanson (2001), propose a series 
of theoretical models based on the NEG/NTT analytical framework that allow 
the study of dispersion processes as a consequence of trade openness, and by 
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which peripheral locations draw economic activity as a result of the change in 
the economic conditions that favored the pre-openness agglomerated 
equilibrium. By contrast, other researchers have found that these results are 
subject to subtle modelling choices which may qualify the previous results 
(Brülhart, 2011), particularly the actual trade network topology (i.e., the 
geographical features of each specific country and its place in it), on which we 
focus in this study.  
The first theoretical contribution addressing the effects of trade openness in the 
location of economic activity between and within countries is Krugman and 
Livas-Elizondo (1996), who consider an economy composed by a 2-region 
domestic economy and a foreign country ("the rest of the world"), whereas 
international transport and non-transport related costs (tariffs) become 
progressively lower between countries while domestic transport cost keeps 
constant or is costless. Their model explains the existence of large cities in 
some developing countries as a consequence of the strong forward and 
backward linkages that appear in a context of a relatively small closed economy 
with a strong manufacturing sector. They assume a homogenous space where 
locations are identically distributed; i.e., none of them enjoy a location 
advantage with respect to the "rest of the world" and the distance between them 
is also symmetric. In their study these authors study how the agglomeration 
equilibrium breaks up once a country starts a trade liberalization process. They 
argue that in nearly closed developing countries, characterized by significant 
economies of scale and high trade barriers, where manufacturing production is 
basically addressed to domestic demand, the agglomeration forces prevail over 
the disadvantages of overcrowded locations (congestions costs which they 
model through the typical land-rent approach). Instead, as the degree of 
openness of the country increases, "centripetal forces" weakens against 
"centrifugal forces", and production tends to become evenly spread across 
domestic regions, even when none of them initially agglomerates the entire 
mobile sector.2 An alternative model to Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996) is 
                                            
2 Building on Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996), Fujita et al. (1999, chap. 18) explore the 
sectoral dimension. They introduce an additional agglomeration force, by including input-output 
linkages between production sectors, therefore becoming more profitable being closer to other 
11 
 
by Behrens et al. (2007a). These authors adopt a model based on the 
monopolistic competition framework of Ottaviano et al. (2002), where, instead of 
congestion costs, they consider two dispersion forces à la NEG (Krugman, 
1991): on the one hand, part of the labor force is immobile-farmers; and on the 
other, local agglomeration increases competition resulting in a reduction of 
revenues. They draw the same conclusions: In so far an economy removes its 
barriers to international trade, agglomeration forces weaken while dispersion 
ones begin to play a more important role.  
Alonso-Villar (1999) enhances Krugman and Livas-Elizondo's (1996) model by 
introducing a more realistic assumption about the existence of a heterogenous 
location of regions with respect to the rest of the world and among themselves. 
Thus, some regions enjoy better access to foreign markets, since they are 
located closer to the national border-and vice versa. More specifically, she 
considers a world economy composed by three countries along a line (a star 
topology), where the country in the middle has three regions (yet another star 
configuration with two external and one interior location), while the other two 
countries consist of one single region (a 1+3+1 setting). All regions are 
equidistant of their neighbors. In a situation of no international trade barriers (full 
economic integration), where only transport costs (proxied by distance) matter 
as impediment to trade, she finds that if one foreign country is economically 
large enough (acting as global attracting force), the agglomeration in the 
internal region of the central country would never be a stable equilibrium. 
Instead, the activity of the country would tend to agglomerate in the border 
region with better access to the foreign rich region. However, the final solution is 
more involved, since under this model both agglomeration forces and dispersion 
forces might be weakened. From the side of agglomeration forces, domestic 
producers can find more attractive to locate their firms close to foreign demand; 
however, on the other side, if foreign competitors exert a strong competition, 
domestic producers might look for less exposed locations while serving their 
own domestic market, where they have a privileged position. Therefore, the final 
equilibrium is not cut clear and once again depends on various initial features, 
                                                                                                                                
suppliers or client firms. They conclude that with trade openness appears a tendency toward the 
agglomeration among some sectors (clustering). 
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as where is economic activity concentrated prior to trade liberalization (i.e., its 
distribution resulting from historical reasons), the relative size of the foreign 
demand, and the productive efficiency of foreign competitors (e.g., technological 
features).  
Another interesting version is Brülhart et al. (2004). Inspired on the EU 
enlargement, under which ten Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) were integrated into the EU's internal market, these authors study how 
changes in market access with the new members affect the peripheral regions 
of the pre-enlargement incumbents (i.e., new border regions). They propose a 
model of two countries (domestic and foreign countries) and three regions. Two 
of the regions belong to the domestic country while the other just contains one. 
The agglomeration forces are the usual backward and forward linkages. In the 
NEG fashion the dispersion force arises from the fact that one of the sectors 
(agriculture) only uses the immobile factor (farmers), while the other 
(manufacturing) employs also a factor (human capital) that is mobile. The 
results of their model remain relatively close to those found by Alonso-Villar 
(1999) in so far as, for most of the parameters, when the domestic economy is 
increasingly opened, the mobile industry tends to locate closer to the foreign 
region. However, this does not take place always. If, for instance, the internal 
region of the domestic country exhibits a sufficiently high industry concentration, 
then, this agglomeration can result in a stable equilibrium. This model presents 
two advantages in comparison to Alonso-Villar's (1999) approach: On one side, 
it allows the evaluation of the progressive effect of trade liberalization (in spatial 
networks characterized either by a homogenous or a heterogenous topology); 
on the other, it can be solved analytically.  
 
3. The model 
The multi-country multi-regional model that we introduce to address the issue of 
trade openness and the spatial location of economic activity enhances the 
existing literature in three distinctive ways, so as to gain more insight of the 
agglomerating and dispersing forces driving the spatial equilibria. Firstly, as in 
Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996) we intend to capture the effect of trade 
openness on the internal distribution of production and population adopting a 
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suitable NEG/NTT analytical framework, while considering more general and 
realistic assumptions. Secondly, following Alonso-Villar (1999) we formulate our 
model for a multi-country multi-regional setting that allows us to study the role of 
the spatial topology on the spatial distribution of economic activity. We propose 
a flexible setting based on a bilateral distance matrix that  characterizes any 
type of network topology with both transport and non-transport related trading 
costs, including the homogenous space where no region has a locational 
advantage, or a heterogenous space with locations enjoying better accessibility 
both within countries (e.g., central regions) or between countries (e.g., border 
regions). Thirdly, as in Fujita et al. (1999) we adopt a general model with two 
sectors differentiated in several ways, from the degree of product 
substitutability, individual transport costs, and technological characteristics. The 
result of these generalizations is that the model does not have closed form 
solutions, and therefore we solve it computationally to perform suitable 
simulations that allow us to address the research hypotheses for the specific 
topologies of interest, and test under what condition would trade liberalization 
increase or reduce within-country spatial inequalities (section 4). 
We assume a world economy with a number of regions situated in different 
countries that are denoted by way of a double subscript ,ikR  with the first one 
referring to the specific region 1, ..., , ..., ,i j n  and the second one to the particular 
country they belong to 1, ..., ,..., .k l m  Within countries we consider a NEG 
framework with two differentiated sectors, 1 2, ,s   with preferences 
characterized à la Dixitz and Stiglitz (1977). Production is subject to increasing 
returns to scale within a monopolistic competition market structure in the first 
sector and constant returns to scale in a perfectly competitive setting in the 
second. Trade takes place over a trading network connecting all regions and 
countries. Trade costs between regions and countries are of the iceberg form 
and include both a distance related cost over the transport network, and ad 
valorem tariffs when trade takes place between regions of different countries-to 
study the effect of trade liberalization. Each region j  of a given country k  is 
endowed with an exogenously given mass of 1 2ik ik ikL L L   workers-consumers, 
each supplying one unit of labor —thereby coinciding country population and 
country labor. In each country labor is fixed and normalized to one for each 
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sector, 1sik
i
L  . Labor in the first sector is mobile within countries, i.e., workers 
can migrate across regions, but immobile across countries due to immigration 
restrictions. It is also assumed that labor is immobile in the second sector as it 
is based on local resource endowments (e.g., agriculture). 
3.1. Preferences 
Preferences of a representative consumer in region j  and country l  are defined 
over a continuum of varieties of two horizontally differentiated goods si :  
 
 1 21 2 ,jl jl jlU D D   (1) 
where Dsjl stands for the aggregate consumption of each differentiated good in 
sectors 1 2,s   ; 0 1s   is the share of income spent on each differentiated 
good, and 1 2 1.    The aggregate consumption of each differentiated good is 
given by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) sub-utility function 
 
 11( )/( ) ( , )( ) ,
s
ss s
si
s jl s ik jl
k i
D d d

   

     
   (2) 
where ( , )( )s ik jld   is the individual consumption in region j  of country l  of sector- 
s  variety   produced in region i situated in country k , including that to which i  
belongs; and si  is the set of sector-s varieties produced in .i  The parameter 
1s   measures the constant price elasticity of demand and the elasticity of 
substitution between any two varieties. Let ( , )( )s ik jlp   denote the price of sector-
s variety   produced in region i  in country k  and consumed in region j  in 
country l ; and let jlw  denote the wage rate in region j  in country .l  
Maximization of (1) subject to the budget constraint: 
 
 
1 21 1 2 2
d d( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,i iik jl ik jl ik jl ik jl jlk i p d p d w             (3) 
 
yields the following individual demands: 
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1
( , )
( , )
( )( ) ,ss ik jls ik jl s jl
sjl
p
d w
g


    (4) 
 
where 
   11 1	 d( , ) s ssisjl k i s ik jlg p          (5) 
is the CES price index in sector s and region j  of country .l  
 
3.2. Technology, trade costs and networks 
Technology is symmetric between firms, regions and countries, thus implying 
that, in equilibrium, firms differ only by the region they are located in. We thus 
henceforth suppress the variety index   to alleviate notation. Production of any 
of the continuum of varieties in the first sector involves a fixed labor 
requirement, ,F  and a constant marginal labor requirement, .c  The total labor 
requirement for producing the output 1 1( , )ik ik jll jx x  is then given by 
1ik 1ikl 	 	F	 	c	x  3. Increasing returns to scale, costless product differentiation, 
and the absence of scope economies yield a one-to-one equilibrium relationship 
between firms and varieties. 
For the second sector, each region produces a single differentiated output 
under constant returns and perfect competition, ensuring that the price of the 
variety in each region equals the salary in this sector. Trade of the differentiated 
goods is costly and sector-specific4. We follow standard practice and assume 
that trade costs are of the iceberg form: 1( , )s ik jl   units must be dispatched 
from region i  in country k  in order for one unit to arrive in region j  in country .l  
We further assume that trade costs are symmetric, i.e., ( , ) ( , ).s ik jl s jl ik    Besides 
                                            
3 For the sake of simplicity, in our simulations we consider that the technological parameters F 
and c are also the same across regions and countries. This assumption could be relaxed to 
explore the effects of different sectoral productivities on the spatial location of economic activity. 
4 Davis (1998) proved that the home market effect depends on the relative size of transport 
costs in the differentiated and homogenous goods, insofar when both industries incur the same 
level of transport costs the home market effect disappears. Picard and Zeng (2005) empirically 
proved how the transport cost parameter for the agricultural sector could be a determinant 
factor for the spatial configuration of economic activity. 
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transport costs, shipping goods between regions of different countries is 
normally subject to non-transport frictions. These normally include tariff barriers, 
non-tariff barriers (red tape, administrative delays, different product 
standards...), and other barriers (language, currency, accounting…). Contrary to 
transport frictions between all regions, regardless the country they belong to, 
these non-transport barriers are country pair specific, and we denote them by  
( , ) ,s ik jl  with 0( , )s ik jl  if i  and j  belong to the same country ,k l  or both 
countries belong to a free trade area; otherwise 0( , )s ik jl  -we also assume 
reciprocity in tariffs: ( , ) ( , ).s ik jl s jl ik  These barriers are considered as an  ad 
valorem tariff in addition to transport costs, and therefore, total trade frictions 
between any two pair of regions are given by 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,( )s ik jl s ik jl s ik jl     with 
1s ik ik ( , ) ,  since 0( , )s ik ik   and 1( , )s ik ik  5.  
Departing from the standard approach in international trade that considers two 
regions  in a single country and the rest of the world, with the latter being either 
a single location as in Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996), or symmetrically 
located on both sides of the country as in Alonso-Villar (1999), requires the 
introduction of the transport network representing the world geography. The 
transport network characterizes a specific configuration of the spatial topology 
both between countries and within countries. When shipping goods it is 
assumed that firms minimize the transport costs between any two regions 
choosing least cost itineraries, Zofío et al. (2014). According to the latter 
premise, if, for simplicity, the distance  between any two neighboring regions is 
normalized to one:  ik jkr ,  = 1  (regardless whether they belong to the same 
country or they are border regions between two countries), and the unit 
transport cost corresponds to a single and common value 1st , then the 
overall transport cost between any two regions separated by a distance  ik jlr ,  is 
given by ( , )( , ) ik jl
r
s ik jl st  . 
The whole trade cost structure including transport (network related) and non-
transport frictions can be described by way of the following symmetric matrix Ts  
                                            
5 Therefore, our transport cost metric  corresponds to an exponential network metric as in 
Behrens et al. (2005, 2007a) or Barbero and Zofio (2015). 
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where each element represents trade frictions between a specific pair of 
regions.  
11 1 11 1 11 1 11 11
21 11 21 1 21 1 21 1 21 21
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    
  
 (6) 
 
This is a both a symmetric and partitioned matrix, where the elements in the 
diagonal correspond to the intra-regional transport costs, i.e., equal to 1 
reflecting costless trade, and therefore origin and destination prices are the 
same. The first and last elements of the transport cost matrix represent the 
transport costs within countries 1 and m . The off-diagonal elements of the 
upper-right corner and lower-left matrices represent the cross-country transport 
costs between countries 1 and ,m  and m  and 1, respectively, which are 
symmetric. Therefore the topological properties of the spatial network 
characterize the transport cost part sij  of the trade frictions matrix sT ,  while the 
non-transport related costs have no relationship whatsoever with the topology.   
 
3.3. Market outcome and spatial equilibria 
For the first differentiated sector, a firm in region i  and country k  has to 
produce 1( , ) 1( , ) 1( , )ik jl jl ik jl ik ljx L d   units to satisfy final demand in region j  in country 
.l  
 1 1 1( , ) 1( , ) .ik jl ik jl ik jl
l j
x L d   (7) 
Using the previous expression, each firm in i maximizes its profit 
  
1
1 1
1
11
ik jj
ik l j ik ikik jl
ik jl
p
cw Fwx         
( , )
( , )
, ,  (8) 
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with respect to all its quantities  1 , ,ik jlx  and taking wages 1 jw  as given. 
Because of CES preferences, profit-maximizing prices display the standard 
constant-markup pricing rule: 
 
 1 1 11( , ) ( , )
.sik jl ik ik jl
s
p cw    (9) 
 Free entry and exit implies that profits are non-positive in equilibrium which, 
using the pricing rule (9) into the total production function satisfying final 
demand (7), yields the standard condition: 
  1 1 ,sik Fx c
   (10) 
and the corresponding labor input is 1 1 .ik ikl F cx   
 
For the second sector, constant returns and perfect competition result in the 
price of the variety produced in region i  equaling the salary 2 2ik ikp w 	 ,  while 
the delivered price in other regions is 2 2 2( , ) ( , ).ik jl ik ik jlp w    
 
3.3.1. The world spatial equilibria 
Adopting a suitable set of normalizations, it is possible to determine the system 
of equations corresponding the so-called instantaneous equilibrium, 
characterizing both unstable short-run and stable long-run spatial solutions. 
Within a country ,k  labor in each region is shared between both sectors, 
,ik 1ik 2ikL L L   and adding across regions: 1.i sikL   
We denote by 1ik  the share of labor supply in region i  of country k  in the first 
sector where labor is mobile, and assume an even distribution of the labor force 
for the second sector for which labor is immobile: 2 1/ .ik n   
We present the spatial equilibrium that exists within each country in the case of 
an open economy where trade between countries takes place; i.e., 0 .sij 
The spatial general equilibrium is completely defined by the following system of 
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equations including the income, ,jy  price, ,sig  and nominal wage, isw ,  
equations, which are complemented with the real wage equations, si :  
 
 21 1 1 2 1 1ik ik ik iky w w i n k mn
     	, , ..., , ,..., ,  (11) 
     11 11 1 11 1 111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
/
( , ) ( , ) ,
n n m
ik ik ik jk jk jk ik jl jl jl ik
j i j l k
g w w w
  
  
             (12) 
     22 22 1 11 1 112 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1
	/
( , ) ( , ) ,
n n m
ik ik ik jk jk jk ik jl jl jl ik
j i j l k
g w w w
  
  
             (13) 
  
1
1 1 1 11
11
1 1 1 11
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
	
/
( , ) ( , ) ,
n n m
ik ik ik jk jk ik jk jl jl ik jl
j i j l k
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       
  
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n n m
ik ik ik jk jk ik jk jl jl ik jl
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       
  
      
  ,		
/
( , ) ( , )  (15) 
 1 21 1 1 2 1 1	 , ,..., , , ...,ik ik ik ikw g g i n k m     . (16) 
 
Both the sectoral price sikg . and wage sikw  equations include the variables 
referring to region i  itself in the first term of their RHS, those related to the rest 
of the regions within the same country k  in the second term, and the 
interactions with the regions of the rest of the countries in the last term.  
As for the income equations (11), they are the sum of the workers' incomes in 
both sectors (depending on the share of the production in the first sector 1ik  
and the equiproportional labor force in the second sector, 1/ n ). Regarding the 
price indices (12) and (13), representing a weighted average of delivered prices, 
they are lower: 1) the larger are the shares of the production in the first sector in 
region i (which is domestically produced), 2) the larger the imports from nearby 
regions rather than distant regions within the same country —as transport costs 
( , )s jk ik  are lower with the former that the latter, and 3) the larger the trade with 
both nearby countries and those with existing trade agreements —as tariffs sij
will be smaller in 1( , ).jl ik  With respect to the wage equations (14) and (15), they 
will be higher  if incomes in other regions and countries with low transport costs 
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and tariffs with i  are also high, as firms pay higher wages if they have 
inexpensive access to large markets.  
Finally, from the price and wage equations one obtains real salaries- equation  
(16)-as the cornerstone of the model driving the migration of the workers of the 
first sector across regions in a country. Comparing the real salaries within a 
country, an equilibrium is observed if they are equal across regions 
1 1 , .ik jk i j k     Otherwise, and following standard NEG migration rules, if 
there are differences  between real salaries, simple dynamics ensure that 
regions with higher salaries draw workers from below-average salaried regions 
until real wages equalize. Note that real salaries could be different between 
countries but not across regions in each country. This is because of the 
restrictive migration laws and physical barriers (e.g., US-Mexico wall, Spanish-
North African fence...) preventing people movements across the borders.  
 
3.3.2. Autarky and trade-openness equilibria  
Looking at the system of non-linear equations representing the instantaneous 
equilibrium, it can be seen that when ( , ) ,s ik jl   the last sets of terms in the 
RHS corresponding to other countries tend to zero, and therefore the spatial 
location of economic activity corresponds to a standard multi-regional NEG 
model without a multi-country dimension—i.e., from a trade perspective a 
situation of autarky equivalent to that discussed by Barbero and Zofío (2015) for 
different network topologies. In this framework each country presents specific 
locational patterns depending on how its geography and transport network 
shape its spatial topology, as well as the existing transport cost levels.   
 
4. The effects of trade openness on the distribution of economic 
activity within a country 
As argued above, it is very difficult to obtain general results in the multi-region 
multi-country setting, because the equilibrium allocation of economic activity in 
the first mobile manufacturing sector is determined by a complex trade-off 
between the inherent NEG/NTT centrifugal and centripetal forces, model's 
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parameters, network topology and transport and non-transport related costs. 
This is particularly true for our model as any world trade network both within and 
between countries can be defined. However we can gain more systematic 
insights into how trade liberalization and the structure of the trading network 
influence the equilibrium distribution of economic activity by choosing some 
relevant configurations and resorting to systematic numerical simulations aimed 
at determining the critical break-point and sustain-point values. 
The research strategy is as follows. First, we study the standard NEG results 
within a single country, and determine the long run-equilibria of economic 
activity in its regions by way of the bifurcation diagram (tomahawk) summarizing 
the locational patterns of economic activity. This is equivalent to study a closed 
economy (autarky) within a world trading network. Subsequently, we allow for 
trade openness with a second country, and study how international trade flows 
alter the distribution of economic activity within our first reference country; i.e., a 
systematic comparison of pre and post openness situations. In doing so, we 
consider for our first benchmark country two different topologies that are 
completely opposed; namely a homogenous topology where all regions are 
equally located with respect to each other and there are no locational 
advantages (geometrically represented by an equilateral polygon —known as 
the race-track economy in the literature), and a heterogenous topology where 
one central region enjoys a comparative advantage (geometrically represented 
by a star—hub and spoke—topology). While other alternative network 
topologies are possible, our results for these two extreme cases of network 
centrality allow us to set lower and upper bounds (range) for the results that 
would be obtained for intermediate topologies, see Barbero and Zofío (2015).   
Once the research strategy has been laid out, we illustrate the effects of trade 
liberalization for the particular case of two countries consisting of three regions 
each, and focusing the analysis on the two opposed domestic topologies 
already mentioned: a triangle topology (all regions are equidistant and there are 
not transport related advantages), and a line topology (a region is in the center 
of the domestic network)6. The main results refer to the usual critical values 
                                            
6 These two extreme topologies for three regions have been also studied in the NEG literature 
by Ago et al. (2006) and Castro et al. (2012), even if for the simpler seminal model of Krugman 
(1991) considering a homogenous and a differentiated sector. 
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determining the disperse or agglomerated  outcomes; i.e., those identifying the 
transport cost thresholds for the mobile sector for which full dispersion is no 
longer stable (break-points), and for which full agglomeration is unfeasible 
(sustain-points). Therefore we first assess these scenarios in the context of 
autarky, and afterwards once the economy progressively opens to international 
trade. In doing so we change the transport cost of sector 1 and trade barriers to 
determine a wide range of scenarios, and identify the stable and unstable 
equilibria for each degree of openness.  
4.1. A closed economy with homogenous space 
 
Figure 1 shows the complete topology including two countries and their 
associated distance matrix, each consisting of three regions with a homogenous 
triangle topology. The second country is symmetric to the first one in this case, 
so we assume that its labor force in both sectors is also evenly distributed: 
2 1 3 1 2 1 2 3/ , , , , ,sj s j     7. Both countries are connected through two of its 
regions situated at their shared border (at the same distance as that between 
the regions of each country)8. It is among the regions belonging to the different 
countries where one finds different distances, which are no longer the same for 
all regions, thereby altering the neutrality of space as a force shaping the 
                                            
7 The location of the first sector activity in the second country: 1 2l , is also subject to the forces 
that shape that of the reference country; i.e., real salaries in the regions of the second country 
will be affected by the same trade openness process. We shall take into account these 
feedback effects associated to changes in the distribution of the first sector in the second 
country when they result in different equilibria for the location of economic activity in the first 
country: 1 1i . For brevity, these results are not reported, but are available upon request. 
Nevertheless, we highlight that the rank of the real wages among the three domestic regions 
does not change for the three extreme scenarios: all workers of the sector 1 are evenly spread 
across the foreign regions ( 1 2 1 3/j  , 1 2 3, ,j   ); all workers of the sector 1 are equally 
agglomerated on the two bordering regions ( 1 2 1 2/ ,j  1 2, ;j   and when all workers are 
concentrated on the farthest location ( 112 1  ). The most remarkable result is that in this last 
scenario the domestic salaries achieve their higher levels, while when the agglomeration is at 
both sides of the national border wages are lower. This might be motivated for the 
agglomeration costs in terms of an extreme increase of the other sector's prices (sector 2), 
which becomes scarce under this agglomeration situation.  
8 There are other possible connections or links, such as: the union of a single region of each 
country; or one region of one country with two regions of the other country. In order to simplify 
matters, in this paper we focus on only one of them, which resembles the network configuration 
of countries like Spain; where Madrid would be region 1 and Catalonia and the Basque Country 
would be regions 2 and 3, both connected to the French Border. 
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location of economic activity through transport costs. In fact, the distance 
between region 1 in country 1 and region 1 in country 2 is the longest: 11 12 3( , ) .r   
In sum, we go from two homogenous topologies to a single heterogeneous 
network, where two groups of regions arise: those four situated at the border 
with better accessibility, and two remote regions in the cul-de-sac of the two 
countries. 
 
Figure 1 Graphical representation of two countries characterized by a 
homogenous topology and the equivalent matrix of distances (within and 
between countries). 
 
0 1 1 3 2 2
1 0 1 2 1 2
1 1 0 2 2 1
3 2 2 0 1 1
2 1 2 1 0 1
2 2 1 1 1 0
( , )ik jlr
           
 
 
For the autarky scenario  
Figure 1 is reduced to the first triangle, where no region has a geographical 
advantage in its trade relationship with the others.  Alike the T matrix including 
the total cost of transportation between regions only includes as elements these 
bilateral distances, which are normalized to one. 
Figure 2 represents the tomahawk with respect to the transport costs of sector 1 
(mobile sector) comprised between the values 1 and 2. In other words, it depicts 
all the population shares which are in equilibrium, distinguishing whether they 
are long-run stable (blue or green hollows) or are short-run unstable; i.e., 
sensitive to small changes (red dots), for the different transportation costs of 
sector 1. For comparison purposes, the values of the rest of parameters 
considered henceforth, unless indicated otherwise, correspond to those 
normally adopted in the literature initiated by Fujita et al. (1999): 0 4.  , 1 5,   
2 10,  1 2752t 	 	 . ,  and assume that workers of the immobile sector 2 are 
evenly distributed; i.e., 2 1 1 3/i  for each region. The results show that at 
relatively low levels, and from relatively high levels of transport costs borne by 
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sector 1, the symmetric equilibrium is stable; i.e., each region holds an equal 
share of manufacturing activity and associated population, 1 1 1 3/ ,i   1 2 3, , .i      
 
Figure 2 Bifurcation with two differentiated sectors, t2=1.275. Autarky 
economy composed of 3 regions, ( , )s ik jl   . Triangle topology. 
 
 
However, for intermediate values of transport costs, agglomeration forces 
prevail, resulting in a stable core-periphery equilibrium (blue hollows, where 
sector 1 is fully agglomerated on location 1 ( 111 1  )) or, for a smaller range of 
trade costs, in a semi-core-periphery equilibrium (green hollows, where the 
mobile economic activity is concentrated on the bordering regions ( 1 1 1 2/ ,i   
where 2 3,i   )). Therefore we refer to a core-periphery equilibrium when one 
region concentrates all the labor and industrial activity of sector 1. Whereas we 
talk about a semi-core-periphery equilibrium when two regions concentrate all 
their industry in sector 1. The symmetric balance becomes unstable for this rank 
of intermediate transport costs. Between the two extreme solutions, core-
periphery and flat-earth, just arise some unstable equilibria that gather different 
degrees of population. These are between the critical values of break-point 
(which breaks up the stable symmetric equilibrium) and sustain-point (at which 
the core-periphery equilibrium becomes unstable). This result generalizes the 
most complex NEG outcome in Fujita (1999) to three regions, concluding that 
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under a symmetric topology and given the agglomeration and dispersion forces 
considered in the model, for sufficiently high or sufficiently low transport costs 
for sector 1, the homogenous distribution of the mobile sector appears as a 
stable equilibrium.  
However, for intermediate transport costs, the stable equilibrium corresponds to 
a core-periphery structure, where all the activity of sector 1 is either 
concentrated in a single location, or symmetrically in the two opposing 
locations. In the next section we analyze the effect of trade liberalization on 
these results, identifying which regions gain/lose from the opening up process. 
 
4.2. How trade openness favors bordering regions by 
changing the trade network topology  
 
The stability of the dispersed (flat-earth) equilibrium: Triangle topology in both 
countries  
 
To study the break-points  
Figure 3 [Panel a] plots the variation in the difference in real wages between 
workers of sector 1 across regions of the same country ( 1k  ) under autarky: 
( , )s ik jl   , and complete trade openness: 0( , ) ,s ik jl   when a marginal change in 
population takes place: 1 1 0i  . Note that only workers of sector 1 move across 
regions of a given country, being drawn by the region(s) with the highest real 
wage(s); i.e., workers respond to changes in real wage differentials.  
Figure 3 [Panel a], known as the wiggle diagram, depicts the transport costs 
values for which the symmetric distribution of workers is stable. As a typical 
break-point exercise, the starting point is the symmetric —flat-earth— 
distribution of workers across regions ( 1 1 1 3/i  , in our case). Therefore, the 
graph records the change in real wage differentials under marginal changes in 
the population, 1 1 1 1( )/ ,i j i     along the range of transport costs of said 
sector 1 comprised between the values 1 and 2. Thus the symmetric equilibrium 
will only be stable if an increase of population brings a lower real wage in the 
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incoming (receiving) region. Graphically, this is observed for transport costs 
where the wage differentials are below zero, corresponding to a stable 
condition; by contrast, when they are above, we face reinforcing agglomeration 
dynamics.  
 
 
Figure 3 Break point [Panel a] and Sustain Point [Panel b] in region 1 and 
region 2 (or 3) in country 1 before and after the openness of the economy. 
Where both countries have a triangle topology, 1 2752t . , 1 1 3/ ,ik   
1 2 3, ,i     and 1 2, .k    
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The solid line recalls the break point results of the previous section for the case 
of a closed economy, an autarky. Note that since this is a closed economy 
characterized by the triangle topology, the results between two regions will be 
independent of which two regions are chosen. On the opposite side, when the 
economy is in a liberalization process, the triangle topology does not longer 
prevail, emerging the two aforementioned groups of regions: central (r21 and r31) 
and peripheral ( 11r ). This means that under the same characteristics, in terms of 
population and transport costs (here, in sector 1), there are different reactions of 
wage differentials to population shocks. That is, the marginal increase in the 
population will have a different effect depending on whether the increase occurs 
in a region closer or further away from the new market. The dashed line 
includes the case in which the most peripheral region suffers a positive 
immigration shock. Whereas the dotted line reports the change in the real wage 
differential when it is one of regions closest to the new market the one 
experiencing a population increment. The dashed and dotted line corresponds 
to complete openness, and therefore the difference between these curves and 
the solid line, which corresponds to closed economy, delimit the bounds for the 
long-run symmetric equilibrium  for all other intermediate degrees of trade 
openness: 0 ( , ) .s ik jl     
The study of the  
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Figure 3 [Panel a] shows that for low values of transport costs in sector 1, the 
break point comes first under the scenario of a closed economy, followed by the 
situation of an almost fully integrated trade area when the positive shock of 
migration affects one of the new core locations. So the break-point arises later 
when, in an open situation, it is the peripheral region ( 11r ) which receives 
immigrants. This means that the transport costs that keep sustainable the 
homogenous distribution have to be higher when we study a more peripheral 
region in an open economy, than in the other extreme scenarios; i.e., in an open 
scenario it is easier for peripheral regions to lose economic activity and 
depopulate. At the other end, when transport costs are high enough to make 
sustainable an even distribution of the economic activity/population, this 
becomes stable first in the situation of closed economy. The opposite case is 
when a region closest to the outside border begins to agglomerate, which 
requires the highest transport costs to make stable the flat-earth distribution; 
i.e., it is easier for better located regions to start agglomerating by drawing 
economic activity from the peripheral regions. An alternative way to analyze this 
is to note that the dotted curve (for a border region, such as 21r ) is always above 
the dashed line (for a more internal — peripheral— region, such as 11r ), which 
means that under the same circumstances (migratory shock and transport 
costs), the change in the real wage differential in the frontier region is always 
greater than for the new periphery, in an open economy. This also means that 
the range of values for which the homogenous space is unstable is greater 
when the incoming or receiving region has a locational advantage in an open 
economy, since it is more probable that it generates a self-reinforcing 
agglomeration effect.  
 
 
The stability of the agglomerate (core-periphery) equilibrium: Triangle topology 
in both countries  
 
 
Figure 3 [Panel b] shows the levels of transport cost in sector 1 in a 
situation where one of the regions agglomerating all the economic activity 
is stable; i.e., a sustain-point exercise. As in the previous case, we take as 
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reference two extreme scenarios: a closed economy: ( , )s ik jl    (solid line) 
and an open economy: 0( , )s ik jl   (dashed and dotted lines). The values 
shown in the graph are the differences in real wages between an empty 
region j , in terms of workers from sector 1, and a region that 
agglomerates all the workers, .i  1 1j i  , for each value of transport costs 
between 1 and 2. Thus, the core-periphery equilibrium is stable if the wage 
difference is negative, i.e. the curve is below zero, meaning that the region 
that holds all workers also shows the higher real wages. In all cases this 
only occurs among intermediate values of transport costs. Once again 
consistent with the bifurcation diagram in  
Figure 2 for the autarkic economy, we recall the well-known centrifugal effect 
that breaks the core-periphery equilibrium when transport costs reach a high 
enough value, as a result of the existence of an immobile demand associated to 
the workers of the second sector. The fact that no agglomeration is fully stable 
at very low transport costs is uncommon. Just to clarify, this is due to two 
features of the second sector that go against the agglomeration (besides the 
aforementioned fixed demand): On one hand, it produces differentiated 
products, what makes more attractive those products; on the other hand, its 
trade incurs in transportation costs, which increases the consumption price 
index, especially in areas with high demand (large population). In other words, 
this result does not appear if the second sector were to produce perfectly 
homogenous goods, 2 ,   and did not incur transport costs 2 0.t   This result 
is also observed for the open economy. However, the graph shows that the 
outcome for a closed economy situates between the extreme cases in which, in 
an open economy, all mobile workers agglomerate in the peripheral region (with 
worse accessibility than any region in the homogenous autarky network) and 
the better located border regions (with better accessibility); being the region that 
becomes remote after the full commercial opening the one that shows the 
lowest real wages. On the opposite side, there is the case of an open economy 
where the working population is located in a region near the foreign market; in 
this case, the range of intermediate transport costs for which this situation is 
stable is greater. That is, compared to a closed economy situation where no 
region has a geographical advantage, trade openness polarizes the effects of 
transport costs, being more stable the agglomeration in regions closer to the 
new trading partner. Graphically, the lower the wage differential curve, the 
30 
 
larger the wages in the agglomerating region, leaving a wider range of transport 
costs for which the initial agglomeration is sustainable. 
 
 
Trade openness and instantaneous equilibria 
 
We now explore the results for different degrees of trade openness in the form 
of alternative values of the non-transport frictions —ad valorem tariffs . Figure 
4 shows the distribution patterns of the mobile sector that represent an 
equilibrium, for relevant ranges of openness: 0 2[ , ].   These equilibria may be 
stable (symbolized with hollows); i.e., robust to small changes in population, or 
unstable (symbolized by dots); i.e., sensitive to small changes in the population, 
which would lead to one of the stable equilibria. Surprisingly, the results show 
that given transportation costs 1 1 4.t   and 2 1 275. ,t   the core-periphery 
structure 111 1  , or 1 1 1 2 2 3	/ , ,i i   , is always a stable equilibrium for any 
degree of trade openness, regardless of whether the regions that agglomerates 
are bordering regions or  the most inner region, i.e. opening to trade does not 
have regional consequences. This shows the resilance of the agglomerated 
equilibrium. Indeed, when the economy is an autarky;  i.e.,   tends to infinity, 
the alternative distribution of the mobile sector between the three regions 
emerges as an unstable equilibria (all regions hold economic activity in the 
mobile sector representing the so-called pseudo flat-earth by Barbero and Zofío 
(2015); and depicted graphically with red dots).  
 
Figure 4 Bifurcation in region 1 in country 1 respect to the degree of 
openness of the economy, t1=1.4 and t2=1.275. Triangle topology in both 
countries, where 1 2 1 3 1 2 3/ , , , .i i    
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However, when an opening process starts (  tends to zero), only those 
combinations in which the farthest region to the external market ( 11r ) 
progressively increases its population are equilibria, though unstable, making 
smaller the area where the whole agglomeration in the new periphery location is 
stable —otherwise a process of relocation toward the other two regions will 
begin. In short, if a closed economy starts from a symmetric distribution, the 
openness process will tend to agglomerate the mobile sector in one of the 
bordering regions. Only if the inner region were to increase its share of 
population with the integration process, the core-periphery equilibrium would not 
emerge. Therefore we note that having a large share of population allows 
offsetting the locational disadvantages of the inner region emerging from the 
new network, through the home market effect and the productive advantage of 
the economies of scale. 
Finally, the set of graphics in  
 
Figure 5 illustrates a detailed analysis of the indirect utility of individuals 
(hereafter real wages) in each region under the two traditional spatial 
distributions studied for the mobile sector: core-periphery and full dispersion 
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configurations9. This analysis complements those already made when 
searching of the break and sustain points presented in  
Figure 3 [Panel a] and [Panel b]. In those figures the comparative statics 
analysis between the wages was dyadic; i.e., between two regions (real wage in 
the central region versus real wage in one of the peripheries), and for extreme 
values of tariffs ( 0,  which approaches the case of full openness and 2,   
which leads to the autarky scenario). Here we analyze simultaneously the 
salaries for the three regions and we do it for all values of   comprised in the 
selected range. The transport costs assumed are 1 1 4.t   for sector 1 and 
2 1 275.t   for sector 2. Given these intermediate transport costs we observe a 
rich range of equilibria. Moreover, as the range of real wages in the y-axis is the 
same, we can compare the three cases analyzed (full dispersion, agglomeration 
in region 1 and agglomeration in one of the regions closely located to the other 
country), and see under what circumstances regional wages reach higher 
values. The first panel of  
 
Figure 5 [Panel a] depicts the case in which economic activity is equally 
distributed across the three domestic regions ( 1 1 1 3/ ,i  in our case, where 
1 2,i    and 3 ). For high values of 2   we get the same results that those 
obtained under the symmetric network economy in autarky. We know 
from the analysis of the autarky that under these circumstances all 
regions have the same wage and this is a stable equilibrium distribution 
for transport costs in sector 1 lower than 1.1 ( 1 1 1.t  ) or above 1.7 ( 1 1 7.t  ), 
approximately, and unstable for the intermediate costs ( 
Figure 2). With the opening up process; i.e., the smaller are the level of tariffs 
, a significant increase is observed in real wages in the bordering regions, and 
only when  is sufficiently small, region 1 also yields a slight growth. In 
conclusion, trade liberalization appears to cause in the short term a clear real 
wage increase in border regions, which in the long run suggests that people 
would tend to agglomerate in them. According to the results of the tomahawk 
(Figure 4), we know that this is a stable equilibrium distribution. 
                                            
9 These indirect utility values may be considered as a straightforward measure of welfare 
(Castro et al., 2012). However, it is clear that from a comprehensive perspective, these 
measures do not take into account the real wages of workers in the immobile sector, neither the 
likely externalities, in terms of regional inequality, that emerges from the full concentration of 
mobile sector in a unique location. For different definitions of welfare in the NEG model see 
Charlot et al. (2006). 
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The following panel of  
 
Figure 5 [Panel b] shows the scenario in which the entire population working in 
the mobile sector is concentrated in the furthest region to the foreign country (
111 1,  1 1 0,i   2 3,i   ). Whereas [Panel c] reflects the opposite scenario, 
where the economic activity of sector 1 is concentrated in one the frontier 
regions ( 111 0,  1 1 1,i   2 3i   or ). In the case of autarky ( 2  ), as expected, 
results in both graphs are equivalent, accruing from the triangle topology. 
However, with trade liberalization (reduction of  ) the evolution of real wages 
differs. In both cases, the regions that agglomerate the economic activities of 
the mobile sector show the highest salary for the whole range of tariff costs 
considered, but when the economic activity of sector 1 is concentrated in the 
furthest region of the home country ( 11r ), the opening process means a 
progressively reduction in the wages in this region and an increase in the 
periphery.  
By contrast, when the agglomeration takes place in the frontier, the opening up 
process to international market entails a monotonic increase in wages in this 
location and in the other border region (with increased accessibility), while in the 
new periphery ( 11r , after the openness) hardly there are any changes
10.  
 
 
Figure 5 Real wage in each domestic region for different degrees of 
openness 0 2[ , ],  1 1 4.t   and 2 1 275. .t   Triangle topology in both 
countries. 
 
                                            
10 As it was mentioned these results are robust to alternative distributions of the economic 
activity of sector 1 in the second country, that in our base simulation is set evenly across 
regions; i.e., 1 2 1 3/ ,j  1 2 3  , , .j   Real wages in all three regions as trade liberalization 
increases for alternative distributions of economic activity are available upon request. These 
alternative scenarios agglomerate economic activity either in the farthest region: 112 1,  or 
symmetrically in the border regions: 1 2 0 5. ,j   2 3, .j   Real wage patterns and the sign of the 
differences between regions are unaffected by these changes. 
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In general, we have observed that assuming a homogenous (triangle) topology, 
trade liberation increases real wages in the case of the border regions. This 
result aligns with the expectation, given the expressions that define sector's 1 
real wages (16), which are positively related to nominal wages (14) and 
negatively related to the price indices (12) and (13). In the case of the nominal 
wage, if we assume that all regions face a similar price index, then its value 
would be larger the higher is the income of the closest neighbors (lower 
transport costs). As for the price indices, both for the sector 1 and 2, if we 
assumed a nominal wage similar across the different locations, these indices 
would be lower the higher is the share of these sectors in regions with low 
transport costs. Therefore, through the reduction of tariff barriers, the 
emergence of new trading partners will benefit more the border regions, since 
they are closely located to them, having three direct neighbors under trade 
openness instead of two in autarky.   
 
4.3.  A closed economy with heterogenous space  
 
 
Figure 6, like  
Figure 1, shows the trade network with its corresponding distance matrix 
consisting of two countries with three regions each. In this case the country of 
interest presents a star topology, where the central region is that located further 
away from the foreign economy, so again their exports must go through another 
domestic (border) region11. However, according to the domestic market, this 
topology gives a locational advantage to the central region ( 11 ,r  in this case). 
Their graphical representation could be a straight line or, as here, an open 
equilateral triangle to ease comparisons with the previous topolgy.  
 
 
                                            
11 This resembles the situation of Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs); i.e., 11r  could be 
considered as a third country on its own, facing difficulties to develop economically through 
foreign trade. See the reports by the UN Office of the High Representative for the Least 
Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, 
http://unohrlls.org/about-lldcs/. 
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Figure 6 Graphical representation of two countries: Country 1 with the 
star topology and country 2 with the triangle topology. And the equivalent 
matrix of distances (within and between countries). 
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Figure 7 represents the tomahawk diagram of the 3 region closed 
economy characterized by the star topology, regarding alternative 
transport costs of sector 1 (mobile sector). This graph draws the shares of 
the population in the central region 1, being the rest of the population 
perfectly divided among the other regions, for which the economy is in 
equilibrium. As in  
Figure 2, the stable equilibria are represented by blue and green circles 
while the unstable equilibria by red dots. The results show that for 
relatively low transport costs the core-periphery configuration, where the 
entire population is agglomerated in region 1 (blue hollows), emerges as 
stable equilibrium —indeed much earlier than for the homogenous 
topology in  
Figure 2. By contrast, the symmetric distribution of the whole population 
between the two peripheral regions (green hollows) —leaving the central 
location without manufacturing sector, is now only stable for a relatively smaller 
range of intermediate transport costs, in contrast to the larger range for the fully 
connected triangle topology. The symmetric distribution of the population is only 
stable for extremes transport costs. Instead, for relatively low or high transport 
costs the stable equilibrium arises when the share of population in region 1 
gathers levels above 0.33 (which represents the homogenous distribution of the 
population); more precisely these are between 0.3 and 0.612. And only for 
relatively high transport costs (greater than 1.8), shares of population in region 
1 above 0.6 appear as unstable equilibrium. In conclusion, the central region (
                                            
12 This corresponds to the concept of pseudo flat-earth introduced by Barbero and Zofío (2015), 
as that distribution of manufacturing activity that represents a long-run equilibrium with all 
regions holding manufacturing activity, 0* ,i   but in different proportions. 
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11r ) tends to agglomerate the entire economic activity for a wider range of 
transport costs or concentrate a higher share of the population for extreme 
transport costs. 
 
Figure 7 Bifurcation with two differentiated sectors ( 2 1 275.t  ). Autarky 
economy composed of 3 regions. Star topology. 
 
4.4. How trade openness offsets the locational advantage of 
the central region by changing the world trade network 
topology  
 
The stability of the dispersed (flat-earth) equilibrium: Star and triangle 
topologies for each country, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 [Panel a] shows the analysis of the stability of the symmetric 
equilibrium in the mobile sector 1, taking as starting point the even distribution 
of this sector's activity among the regions of the country of interest. As in 
previous cases the symmetric distribution is a stable equilibrium whenever the 
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real wage in the region receiving immigrants becomes smaller than in the 
departing regions. Therefore, the graph records the change in real wage 
differentials under marginal changes in the population, 1 1 1 1i j i   ( )/ ,  along 
the range of transport costs of sector 1 comprised between the values 1 and 2. 
Graphically, this occurs when the change in the differential wage curve is 
negative, below zero. With respect to  
Figure 3 [Panel a], there is now an autarky scenario where the central region 
enjoys a privileged locational advantage ( 11r ), as the other regions ( 21r  or 31r ) 
must ship their products through it. However, as in the previous case, once 
trade openness takes place it results, ceteris paribus, in uneven effects across 
regions, with a growth in economic activity in those regions whose geographical 
location improves in relative terms, and the opposite for those whose location 
worsens. Therefore, departing either from an even distribution of population 
(flat-earth) or full agglomeration (core-periphery), it is necessary to study the 
existence of break-points and sustain-points at the individual level, since they 
are different for each region. For the break points, whether a positive migration 
shock takes place in a central region or a peripheral one. Note that under the 
chosen world topology, the privileged central region under autarky becomes 
peripheral with a locational disadvantage with respect to the foreign economy 
and its border counterparts, leading to conflicting forces without a clear net 
outcome. 
If we analyze the case of the closed economy and compare it with  
Figure 3 [Panel a] (triangle topology), the central region ( 11r ) provides higher 
(relative) salaries than any of the other regions poorly positioned in the home 
network (r21 or r31), even when it is one of the peripheral region receiving a 
positive migration shock. Graphically the curve that refers to a peripheral region 
( 21r  or 31r ) is always below zero, thus for any level of transport cost a small 
increase in population will never trigger an agglomeration process in the 
periphery, breaking up the symmetric equilibrium. On the other hand, when the 
best located region ( 11r ) receives the immigration inflow, the results are more 
similar to those obtained in the closed economy with the homogenous topology 
(triangle), being at intermediate values of transport costs when the symmetric 
equilibrium ceases to be stable, thereby triggering a process of agglomeration.  
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Figure 8 Break points [Panel a] and Sustain Points [Panel b] in region 1 
and region 2 (or 3) in country 1 before and after the openness of the 
economy. Star and triangle topologies, respectively, t2=1.275, 1 1 3/ik  , 
1 2 3	 	, ,i   and 1 2	, .k   
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Given the world trade network in  
 
Figure 6, trade liberalization reverses the asymmetric effects that arise in 
autarky due to the star topology. So that regions that were originally peripheral (
21r  and 31r ), before the openness to the new market, show higher real wages 
that break the symmetric equilibrium for intermediate transport costs; i.e., 21r  or 
31r  can now agglomerate all the economic activity of sector 1 either individually 
or jointly. Nevertheless, the range of transport costs for which the symmetric 
equilibrium is broken in their favor is still narrower than for the domestic central 
region, even in a context of full trade liberalization. The results for region 11r  
experience a small change with full opening, as the curve is shifted slightly to 
the right, which means that this region will begin to agglomerate, and therefore 
to break the homogenous equilibrium, for higher transport costs. This shows 
that for this network, although trade liberalization favors the border regions, the 
internal uneven topology still weighs considerably. Nevertheless, these results 
are against those in  
Figure 3 [Panel a] (triangle topology), with bordering regions presenting higher 
real wages in relative terms with the full opening process, than the “new” inner 
region, and for all levels of transport costs. Note that the only difference with the 
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previous topology is the absence of the link between 21r  or 31 ,r  whose existence 
would reinforce the locational advantage of the bordering regions by easing 
trade between them instead of having to use 11r  as corridor, since it is still the 
minimum distance between the two: 21 31 2( , ) ,r   via 11.r  If such link existed by way 
of transport infrastructure policy, the results in this section would be equivalent 
to those presented before.  
 
 
The stability of the agglomeration (core-periphery) equilibrium: Star and triangle 
topologies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 [Panel b] presents the sustain points. Thus, as in  
Figure 3 [Panel b], this Figure shows the difference in real wages between an 
empty region j , in terms of sector 1 workers, and a region that agglomerates all 
workers, i : 1 1 ,j i   for each value of transport cost between 1 and 2. Thus, 
the core-periphery equilibrium is stable if the wage difference is negative; i.e., 
the curve is below zero, meaning that the region that holds all sector 1 
economic activity also exhibits the higher real wages. Even for the case of 
autarky, since we analyze a heterogenous space (star topology), we study 
separately the stability of the core-periphery that results when it is the central 
region ( 11r ) or a peripheral region ( 21r  or 31r ), the one constituting the core; i.e., 
starts agglomerating. Results show that, in an autarkic context, peripheral 
regions never agglomerate regardless the transport cost level (i.e., for 1 1 1,i   
2 3, ,i    the curves are always above zero). At the other extreme, 111 1,   with 
the most central region agglomerating the entire labor force of sector 1 for a 
wider range of intermediate transport costs; the range being much larger than 
for the case of a region in a closed economy with a triangle topology. 
42 
 
With full trade liberalization, the results indicate that the initial central region in 
an autarkic economy still enjoys a privileged position compared to the other 
regions of the country, even if for a shorter range of transport costs for which 
agglomeration in this region is stable. A significant change compared to autarkic 
situation appears in the results under the range of the lower transport costs, as 
the inner region ( 11r ) starts agglomerating at higher transport costs after full 
openness. In this range of lower transport costs, the regions closely located to 
the foreign market are the ones that begin to agglomerate before. In short, trade 
liberalization allows agglomeration in border regions, mainly for relatively lower 
transport costs, but when transport costs are relatively high, the central region 
of the domestic network is the one maintaining its hegemony. 
In the homogenous space, trade liberalization gave a clear advantage to the 
border regions. With the introduction of a heterogenous domestic topology, 
where the network favors the furthest region to the foreign market as a result of 
its centrality, the centripetal forces gain relevance without a clear result at first 
sight; i.e., regarding accessibility the domestic network favors the central region, 
while liberalization favors the border regions. In terms of transport costs ranges 
for which agglomeration is feasible, results show that the inner topology 
prevails, especially for relatively high transport costs, and not for relatively low 
transport costs. Even in a context of full opening: 0,   where other regions 
from foreign countries are involved, the importance of the relatively high 
transportation costs, which intensify the cost of trade between the regions, 
make the domestic network to prevail favoring the central region 11 ,r  over the 
positive effect of openness in favor of the best internationally located regions, 
21r  or 31.r  
 
 
Trade openness and instantaneous equilibria 
 
In Figure 9, we summarize the results for different degrees of trade openness in 
the form of alternative values of the non transport frictions —ad valorem tariffs 
.  Compared to Figure 4, the results show that in this case, and given 
transportation costs 1 1 4.t   and 2 1 275. ,t   the core-periphery structure 111 1   or 
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1 1 1 2/ ,i   2 3, ,i    is a stable equilibrium for any degree of trade openness, 
regardless of whether the region that agglomerates is a bordering region or  the 
most inner region. When the economy is an autarky; i.e.,   tends to infinity, we 
find the same unstable equilibria than in the single country scenario, where the 
inner location holds a 10% on the industry activity in sector 1 and the remaining 
80% is perfectly distributed among the border regions.  
 
Figure 9 Bifurcation in region 1 of country 1 respect to the degree of 
openness of the economy, 1 1 4.t   and 2 1 275. .t   Star and triangle 
topologies, respectively, where 1 2 1 3/ ,i   1 2 3	, , .i    
 
 
However, when a process of opening starts (  tends to zero), only those 
combinations in which the farthest region to the external market ( 11r ) 
progressively increases its population are equilibria; otherwise a process of 
relocation will begin toward the other regions. Therefore we note then that the 
increase in the share of population in region 1 allows offsetting the locational 
disadvantages emerging from the new network, through the model's centripetal 
forces. It is remarkable that, in comparison with the homogenous topology 
(Figure 4), the levels of population for the short run unstable equilibria is much 
lower, being under 1/3 of the population, which represents pseudo flat-earth 
situations.  
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Finally, the set of graphs in Figure 10 records the real wages in each region for 
the conventionally analyzed distributions: symmetric dispersion of the mobile 
industry [Panel a], the agglomeration of this sector in the inner region 1 [Panel 
b], and its concentration in one of the border regions [Panel c]. As in  
 
Figure 5, real wages are observed for each value of tariffs  comprised between 
0 and 2, but here the country of interest is characterized by the star topology. 
Panel [a] depicts the scenario where the mobile activity is evenly distributed 
across the three regions ( 1 1 1 3/ ,i   1 2 3, ,i   ). Note that given the model 
parameters, when the tariff is 2   the results correspond to the situation in 
autarky where the star topology entails that real wages in the inner region 11r  
are much higher than in the peripheries 21r  and 31.r  The trade liberalization 
hardly brings a change in the evolution of these series. It is only when tariffs go 
below 0.5 when we find a process of convergence among the real wages. This 
convergence basically comes from the increase of real wages in the border 
regions. However, only when   is practically 0 (as in a single market area such 
as EU or NAFTA) wages in peripheral regions exceed those in the central 
region, and they would start agglomerating. 
[Panel b] shows the case where sector 1 is concentrated in the central region of 
the country of interest. Under this scenario the differences of the real wages 
between the inner region r11 and the peripheries 21r  and 31r  are more intense 
than in the previous case with the homogenous distribution. In fact the real 
wages in the center region are always higher than wages in the border regions, 
and no opening process can reverse that initial situation. It is for very low values 
of   when we observe a smooth reduction in the real wages of region 1 and a 
slight increase of them in the border regions. In short, the impact of the home 
network effect, which favors region 1, dominates over the effect of trade 
liberalization, which favors frontier regions. 
Finally, [Panel c] reflects the scenario where one of the border regions, 21 ,r  
agglomerates the activity of sector 1 symmetrically ( 111 0,  1 1 0 5. ,i   2 3,i   ). 
This graph shows the most striking results observed so far. In general we can 
see, leaving aside for a moment the ranking of the regions, that real wages in 
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the border regions are higher when the economic activity of sector 1 is 
agglomerated in a border location than when it is located in the domestic hub, 
11r , which hardly suffers a change in its real wage levels in both scenarios. The 
next aspect that must be highlighted, starting from the autarchy scenario: 2,   
is that the border region that accumulates said activity does not hold the highest 
real wages of the sector. Instead, the agglomerating region has the lowest real 
wages, followed by the domestic hub region, and being the further border region 
the one that collects the most attractive real wages. One of the main factors that 
is driving this result is the large share of income spent on sector 2 varieties, (
1 0 6.  )13, whose prices have a negative impact on the real wages of this 
region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Real wage in each domestic region for different degrees of 
openness ( 0 2[ , ] ), 1 1 4.t   and 2 1 275. .t   Star and triangle topologies, 
respectively. 
[Panel a] 
                                            
13 We observe that the results are sensible to the value of income spent in each sector. For an 
even 50% share, it is the agglomerating region, regardless its location in the domestic network, 
the one with the highest real wages. However, when the share of income spent in sector 2 is 
larger than 50%, we observe an inverse result. Therefore, the results are specific depending on 
the spending structure in each economy. 
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[Panel b] 
[Panel c] 
 
More specifically, the mechanism observed behind these results is as follows: i) 
workers employed in sector 1 of the agglomerating region have the lowest 
nominal wage as they are in large labor supply; ii) by contrast, being one-to-one 
with the firms in the same region, which work under increasing return, allows 
them to buy this sector's varieties at low prices; iii) resulting as a net result in 
the highest real wages in sector 1. However, the existence of another sector 2 
that also produces differentiated goods, but whose immobile industry is evenly 
distributed across regions ( 2 1 1 3j  / ) and also incurs in transport costs, implies 
higher prices for the most crowed and now remote locations. The result is that 
our agglomerating region 2, which has the largest population but does not have 
a privileged position in the domestic network, ends paying the highest prices for 
sector's 2 varieties, followed by its core neighbor region 1, which ends up 
driving the wages of sector's 1 workers down—i.e., counterbalancing the 
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previous positive effect of sector 1's low prices on real wages. Only the 
emergence of new neighbors from other countries through openness, drawing a 
more symmetric topology, offsets the disadvantages coming from the 
agglomeration of sector 1 in one of the periphery regions. With full liberalization, 
this region ends up having the highest real wages, followed by the other border 
region14.  
 
5. Conclusions 
We model the effect of trade openness on the location of economic activity of 
the mobile (manufacturing) industry within a country in a general multi-region 
multi-country NEG/NTT model, paying special attention to different results 
depending on its internal topology; i.e., triangle (homogenous space) or star 
network (heterogenous space), and its connection with that the rest of world 
economy. To carry out this analysis we adapt and extend the models by 
Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996), Alonso-Villar (1999) and Fujita (1999) and 
provide a theoretical answer to the questions posed by Brülhart (2011) 
regarding the effect that trade liberalization has on regional (within-country) 
spatial inequality, depending on their specific geographical location and 
transportation networks (i.e., accessibility). Therefore, considering a 
comprehensive model and alternative network topologies, we can establish how 
the centrifugal and centripetal forces shape the long-term distribution of the 
mobile industry.  
Based on standard assumptions, we analyze the stability of the symmetric (flat-
earth) and the agglomerated (core-periphery) distributions before and after full 
trade openness. We rely on the systematic study of the break-points and 
sustain-points and characterize short and long-run equilibria. Other authors 
(Barbero et al., 2015) studied the effect of the network centrality in a closed 
                                            
14 Again, these results are robust to alternative distributions of the economic activity of sector 1 
in the second country, one we change the default distribution: 1 2 1 3/ ,j   1 2 3, , .j  	 	  Despite the 
alternative distributions agglomerating economic activity either in the farthest region: 112 1;   
one of the border regions, 122 1   or 132 1;   or symmetrically in the border regions: 1 2 0 5. ,j   
2 3, ,j  	  real wage trends and differences are the same. Results of these simulations are again 
available upon request. 
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economy, being their main results that, departing from the flat-earth situation, 
the higher centrality the less likely is the dispersed outcome (and vice versa). 
Here, given the chosen (and opposite) network configurations that we adopt as 
starting points, we consistently observe that  trade opening processes always 
favor border regions, and the dispersed equilibrium becomes more likely in 
relative terms, regardless the initial inner spatial topology, either neutral 
(triangle) or in favor of a central region (star). Therefore, we observe that with 
trade liberalization border regions result favored as a result of their improved 
accessibility in the world transport and trade networks, which can offset an initial 
privileged position of inner regions in the domestic economy if they were to 
agglomerate economic activity in the first place (vice versa, if economic activity 
were already located in border regions). As a result, and keeping in mind this 
result, the redistributive effects of trade liberalization will be therefore subject to 
the topology of the home and international networks as well as to the initial 
distribution of the industry in the mobile sectors. Many simulations with 
alternative topologies are feasible, but these results are robust by constituting 
lower and upper bounds for other topologies.   
 
From our main results we may summarize the distributive effects of trade 
openness by adopting a narrative that, departing from an autarky scenario 
where transport costs of the mobile sector bear intermediate values, ends up in 
a fully integrated "free trade" area: 
i) if the departing point is flat-earth, trade liberalization unambiguously 
results in the breaking up of this structure in favor of agglomeration in 
border regions, regardless the network topology; particularly the more 
central are the border regions-as they are in the homogenous space 
(triangle) with respect to the star considered in this study. 
 
ii) if under autarky the mobile industry is completely located in the 
central region (which is the most likely long-run outcome under the 
described heterogenous star topology), and that region situates 
farther from the foreign market, trade liberalization implies that real 
wages fall slightly in the central region, triggering the dispersion of 
economic activity towards border regions for a wider range of 
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transport costs 1t  and trade openness  . In a homogenous space 
topology, trade openness makes the dispersive effect more intense 
as a result of the lower centrality (in the case of this topology real 
wage differences are lower than for the heterogenous star network). 
However, long-run agglomeration in the inner region remains feasible. 
 
iii) if the region that agglomerates the production of the mobile sector is 
at the border, the effect of trade liberalization depends on the inner 
topology. In the case of the triangle topology, where the border 
regions are well connected with each other, trade liberalization does 
not break this equilibrium, and makes real wages in both border 
regions higher (a net gain in welfare). In the case of the star topology, 
trade liberalization compensates the strong disadvantages that the 
agglomerating region suffers due to its remote location and populated 
situation.   
 
Consequently, in the case of a star topology, which is what emerges historically 
in economies with a hub-and-spoke transport network as a result of strong 
central states as would be the case of France or Spain (in the latter case in the 
periphery of the European continent), and where inner locations such as Paris 
or Madrid enjoy better domestic accessibility, trade liberalization along with 
improved cross-border transport infrastructure results in a weakening of the 
agglomerating forces in favor of border regions. Therefore, a reduction in spatial 
inequality is expected as economic activity shifts to border locations, whose 
connections to foreign markets in the new world trading network are developed; 
i.e., a dispersed equilibrium or even full agglomeration on the border regions 
may emerge when trade liberalization is high enough. Otherwise, economic 
activity remains in the most inner region or, at most, divided between border 
regions, depending on the degree of openness (for a reasonable range of 
model parameters, including the size of the immobile sector); i.e, the inner 
network prevails until non-transport related trade barriers (tariffs) reduce to an 
almost free trade area. Indeed, as we observe in the autarky scenario, the 
agglomeration in one extreme (border) location is not a stable equilibrium as a 
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consequence of the high transport costs borne by this region in the 
consumption of the products from the mobile industry, which increase the price 
index reducing the real wage in that location (the centrifugal force), more than 
the increase of nominal wages as a result of its larger income and scale 
economies (the centripetal forces). However, trade liberalization, when paired 
up with better connections (e.g., the triangle topology), can relieve the pressure 
of prices through the reduction of relative transport costs and the increase the 
nominal wages. 
In conclusion, while in autarky the flat-earth equilibrium can emerge within a 
homogenous space, in a context of trade liberalization, the final long-run 
equilibrium will depend on the particular topology of the case at hand. More 
abstractly, if we think about more complex trading networks than those 
described here, as may be the Spanish case where just some regions are in the 
border (i.e., the Basque Country and Catalonia) and there is a strong central 
hub (Madrid), we can expect that trade liberalization will favor the border 
regions by increasing their accessibility to new markets, but also the 
consolidation of the hub status of the Madrid region at the expense of farther 
peripheral regions such as Andalusia, Extremadura, Castile-La Mancha,... 
situated in the south, which certainly helps to explain their lagging position in  
terms of manufactured and other tradeable goods production, as their location 
both in the domestic and international networks worsens with the liberalization 
process. 
These results have important implications in terms of trade and infrastructure 
policies, which are related in a way that cannot be overlooked as the existing 
literature suggests. As a country decides to reduce protectionism, local, regional 
and central administrations should bear in mind the long term effects of trade 
liberalization on firms' and workers' location decisions. Particularly, the 
attractiveness of locations with better accessibility in terms of the transportation 
network. We have shown that trade liberalization may result in larger or smaller 
spatial inequalities depending on the initial (path dependency) locational 
patterns of the economic activity and the configuration and changes of the 
domestic and international networks, but the direction of these forces have been 
clearly identified. Indeed, as the behavior of economic agents can be 
anticipated, if larger regional inequalities are expected, this undesirable effect 
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could be compensated by appropriate infrastructure investments that may 
counterbalance the centripetal forces associated to trade openness. Indeed, 
while geographical features are given by nature, "second nature" transport and 
non-transport related trade barriers are within the realm of human action that 
our model seeks to explain, and that policymakers and government officials 
should incorporate in their decision making processes. 
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